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A PARTICLE MODEL FOR THE HERDING PHENOMENA INDUCED
BY DYNAMIC MARKET SIGNALS
HYEONG-OHK BAE, SEUNG-YEON CHO, SANG-HYEOK LEE, AND SEOK-BAE YUN
Abstract. In this paper, we study the herding phenomena in financial markets arising
from the combined effect of (1) non-coordinated collective interactions between the mar-
ket players and (2) concurrent reactions of market players to dynamic market signals.
By interpreting the expected rate of return of an asset and the favorability on that as-
set as position and velocity in phase space, we construct an agent-based particle model
for herding behavior in finance. We then define two types of herding functionals using
this model, and show that they satisfy a Gronwall type estimate and a LaSalle type
invariance property respectively, leading to the herding behavior of the market players.
Various numerical tests are presented to numerically verify these results.
1. introduction
Collective behaviors such as aggregation, fads, fashion, flocking and herding are frequently
observed in nature [7, 8, 14, 16, 35] and society [5, 9, 19, 25]. Among these various types
of collective behaviors, the flocking phenomena, in which alignment of the velocity occurs
through the process of adjusting the velocity according to the particles around it, has seen
tremendous progress recently. Several models have been suggested such as the Cucker-Smale
model [16, 17] or Viseck model [34], and many successful mathematical theories have been
developed to understand those models [13, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30].
In this paper, we study the herding behavior arising in financial markets using a particle
model. The term herding is used in several different contexts. The most basic meaning
underlying them is the gathering behavior of individuals to form a group and move as
a group. Therefore, unlike the flocking phenomena, the adjustment occurs also between
position variables and, therefore, the interactions between position and velocity may play
important roles in the dynamics. In finance and economy, herding is often used to describe
the phenomena in which the market players tend more and more to follow the market trend
even though one’s own opinion, information, favorability or instinct are against it [5]. The
expression “information cascade” is also frequently used.
In traditional economics and finance, it is assumed that all agents are rational, and all the
information is already reflected on the price (efficient markets hypothesis), which implies
the absence of bubbles [4, 29, 31, 32]. However, as we can see in the examples of Tulip
mania in 1637, the South Sea Bubble in 1711-1720, the stock market boom in 2000, and the
financial crisis in US housing market in 2007, there have been many irrational events like
bubbles and crashes. It is not clear whether these phenomena are caused solely by herding
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behavior of the market players, but herding definitely plays a crucial role in the formulation
of such phenomena.
Previous works on herding behavior in finance were largely based on sequential analysis
[4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 26, 27], in which the effect of the decision of the first player on the behavior
of subsequent players was analyzed. (See Section 2.) In this paper, we study the herding
phenomena arising from concurrent reaction to other players and dynamic market signals.
By the word “dynamic”, we mean either (1) the signal changes with time, or (2) the signal
is determined by the dynamics of market players.
For this, we introduce two variables: xi(t): the rate of return of assets over time t expected
by ith market player, and vi(t): the favorability that ith market player has on those assets
at time t. These two variables play the role of position and velocity of a self-propelled
particle in the phase space, and enable one to derive a particle model giving dynamical
relations between the rate of return, favorability and the market signal. (See Section 2.) We
then analyze the herding properties of the system by deriving two Lyapunov type herding
functionals satisfying a Gronwall type inequality and LaSalle type invariance conditions
respectively. (See Section 3, 4, 5.)
In flocking models, the occupation of the same place by several particles is considered to
be undesirable [2, 12, 16, 17]. In contrast, we allow “particles” to occupy the same x and
v. Such overlap corresponds to the emergence of consensus on the expected rate of return
and the favorability on specific assets, which is exactly what we try to model.
The outline of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we derive a particle model describing
herding phenomena induced by dynamic market signals. A motivation of our model from
the perspective of a pricing model in finance is also given. In Section 3, our main herding
theorems are presented. Section 4 and Section 5 are then devoted to the proof of the main
results. In Section 6, we provide some relevant numerical simulations. The conclusion and
possible future projects are discussed in Section 7.
2. Particle model for herding behavior in finance
Suppose there are N market players and M assets, such as stocks or real estimates. For
simplicity we assume that no new players or assets enter or leave the market. We then define
xi(t) =
(
x1i (t), · · · , xMi (t)
) ∈ RM and vi(t) = (v1i (t), · · · , vMi (t)) ∈ RM , (i = 1, · · · , N) in
the following way:
• xi(t): the rate of return of the assets 1, · · · ,M expected by market player i over
time t.
• vi(t): the favorability that market player i has on those assets 1, · · · ,M at time t.
We denote x(t) =
(
x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xN (t)
) ∈ RMN and v(t) = (v1(t), v2(t), · · · , vN (t)) ∈
RMN .
It is natural to assume that the market players may consider the value of the asset in a
more favorable way if the expectation on the rate of return rises, and the opposite when the
rate of return decreases. In this regard, we relate xi and vi by
dxi
dt
= vi. (i = 1, · · · , N)
To describe the dynamics of vi, we assume that the market players are very sensitive to
market trend and imitative strategy prevails in the market, which is believed to be true by
both economists and market participants up to certain level. We formulate this assumption
A PARTICLE MODEL FOR THE HERDING PHENOMENA 3
by postulating that the favorability is affected by other player’s assessment in the following
three ways:
(1) Other players’ evaluation on the expected rate of return for the assets:
1
N
N∑
j=1
φij(xj − xi).
(2) Other players’ favorability on the assets:
1
N
N∑
j=1
φij(vj − vi).
In (1) and (2), φij is the communication rate between player i and player j, whose
precise form will be given below.
(3) Various types of signals from the market also influence players’ opinion and decision.
Such an influence can be observed more clearly when the market is experiencing a
rapid transition or turmoil such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the subprime
mortgage crisis in 2008, to name a few. To systematically formulate such signals,
we introduce a function w(x, t), which we call the “dynamic market signal”, and
assume that the favorability on the asset is affected by how big the difference is
between the expected return and the signal:
w(x, t)− xi(t).
Explicit examples of w will be considered below.
By combining the above three effects, we derive our main model:
dxi
dt
= vi,
dvi
dt
=
λx
N
N∑
j=1
φij
(
xj(t)− xi(t)
)
+
λv
N
N∑
j=1
φij
(
vj(t)− vi(t)
)
+ λw
(
w(x, t)− xi(t)
)
,
(2.1)
where λx, λv and λw are interaction strength.
Several choices can be made for the communication rate φij , which determine how
strongly a player’s expected rate of return and favorability are influenced by those of other
players in the market. Throughout this paper, we use
φij := φ(xi, xj) =
1(
1 + |xi − xj |2
) γ
2
for γ > 0. We remark that the effect of noise should be considered for this model to be more
realistic:
dxi
dt
= vi,
dvi =
λx
N
N∑
j=1
φij
(
xj(t)− xi(t)
)
dt+
λv
N
N∑
j=1
φij
(
vj(t)− vi(t)
)
dt
+ λw
(
w(x, t)− xi(t)
)
dt+ σidW
i
t ,
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where σi is the volatility and W
i
t is M -dimensional Brownian motion. Throughout this
paper, however, we neglect the effect of noise and consider only (2.1) for simplicity and
clarity. We leave it as a future project.
Examples of the dynamic market signal w(x, t): We can choose various types of
mathematical expressions for the dynamic market signal depending on the market situation.
Some of the financially interesting examples are:
(a) A sweeping trend of the market that the market players cannot handle. (Ex: abrupt
upheaval in the market such as economic crisis or the rise and fall of foreign currency
exchange rate) In this case, we set
w = w(t)
to be a given function of time.
(b) Asymmetric information or signal from an informed influential market player like
Warren Buffett. Without loss of generality, we fix x1 to be such influential player
so that we can set
w(x, t) = x1.
That is, the rate of return expected by an influential player is a strong affecting
factor in the market
(c) Average market expectation, market atmosphere or some average index such as Dow
Johns index, which is believed to reflect such average market expectation, in which
case we can define
w(x, t) =
1
N
N∑
i
xi.
We will show that the herding behavior induced by these signals can be explained in a
unified manner. (See Section 3.)
Financial motivation of the model: We now provide a financial motivation of our
model (2.1). For that, we recall the geometric Brownian motion for an asset price S(t):
dS
S
= µdt+ σdWt,
where µ is the instantaneous expected rate of return, σ the volatility and Wt the one-
dimensional Brownian motion. We then apply Ito’s formula:
S(t) = S(0)e
∫ t
0
µ(s)− 12σ(s)2ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s)dWs ,
and take expectation E[·] to S(t) to get
E[S(t)] = S(0)e
∫ t
0
µ(s)ds,
or equivalently,
d
dt
logE[S(t)] = µ(t).(2.2)
According to [28], the expected rate of return µ is generated by the following stochastic
differential equation
dµ = a
(
θ − µ)dt+ δσdWt,(2.3)
where the first term represents a long-run regressive adjustment of the expected rate of
return toward a normal rate of return θ with the adjustment speed a, and the second term
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is a short-run extrapolative adjustment of the expected rate of return of the error-learning
type with the adjustment speed δ. Coupling (2.3) with (2.2), we get the following system:
d
dt
logE[S] = µ, dµ = a(θ − µ)dt+ δσdWt.
This can be generically extended to multi-variable system: (i = 1, · · · , N)
d
dt
logE[Si] = µi, dµi = a(θi − µi)dt+ δσidW it .
Rewriting (logE[Si], µi) by (xi, vi) and taking δ = 0, we may express this as a particle
model:
x′i = vi, v
′
i = a
(
θi − vi
)
.
Now, if we make the following choice:
a = λv, θi(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
vj ,
we recover our herding model (2.1) with λx = λw = 0 and φij = 1.
Brief review of the studies in Finance on Herding: Herding behavior in finance
has been extensively studied in the literature including [4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 27]. Herding behavior
is associated with people blindly following the decisions of others [10]. Imitating somebody’s
action can be rational if the predecessor’s action affects one’s (1) payoff structure such that
imitation leads to a higher payoff (payoff externality) and/or (2) his probability assessment of
the state of the world such that it dominates the private signal (informational externality).
Herding due to informational externalities occurs if an agent imitates the decision of his
predecessor even though his own signal might advise him to take a different action. This
herding can also lead to informational cascades. In [5], the concepts of investor herding and
informational cascade are defined:
• An informational cascade occurs in a period t when
P (ht|V,Ht) = P (ht|Ht) ∀V, ht.
• A trader with private information xθ engages in herd behavior at time t if he buys
when V 0θ (xθ) < V
0
m < V
t
m or if he sells when V
0
θ (xθ) > V
0
m > V
t
m; and buying (or
selling) is strictly preferred to other actions.
Here, P (·|·) means the conditional probability, V denotes the value of the new information,
Ht is the history of actions until time t, and ht is the action (buy or sell) taken by the
trader (market player) who arrives in period t, xθ is the private information of trader θ,
V tm := E[V |Ht] is the market maker’s expected value for the asset given public information,
which we sometimes refer to as the price, and V tθ (x) := E[V |Ht, xθ = x] is the expected
value of an informed trader θ.
In an informational cascade, new information on the asset does not affect the decision of
the market players. The above technical definition in [5] of the buying herding behavior can
be expressed in the following three steps: (1) Initially a trader’s evaluation is less than the
market value of the asset, so that he is inclined to sell. (2) The market value of the asset
is, nevertheless, increasing. (3) The trader must want to buy the asset ignoring his own
evalution. Also in [5], it is shown that whether or not herd behavior affects asset prices,
asset prices can certainly affect herd behavior.
Even though it can make a large difference whether the market players decide sequentially
or simultaneously, most herding models are studied sequentially. Up to the best knowledge
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of authors, particle model interpreting it as a dynamical system that reacts concurrently to
other players and the market signal has not been proposed. A related study can be found
in [1, 3], where the flocking behavior of volatility is considered using Cucker-Smale type
models.
As related works, we mention [18, 20], where Boltzmann type kinetic equations were
suggested to model the dynamics of a market and understand the formation of bubbles and
crashes through the combined effect of public information and herding (See also [33].), and
[11] in which a macroscopic herding model of Keller-Siegel type was introduced to simulate
herding behaviours of human crowds.
3. Main results
In this section, we present our main results. We start with some simplification of our
model for the convenience of proof.
3.1. Centralized herding model: We first record a simple result on the averaged motion
xi and vi. Let xc, vc denote the average expected rate of return and the average favorability
respectively:
xc(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t), vc(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
vi(t).
These averaged quantities evolve according to the following simple system:
Lemma 3.1. xc and vc satisfy
d
dt
xc(t) = vc(t),
d
dt
vc(t) = λw (w(x, t)− xc(t)) .
Proof. Since φij = φji for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , we have from symmetry argument
(3.1)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φij(xj − xi) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φij(vj − vi) = 0.
Using these identity with 1N
∑N
i=1 w(x, t) = w(x, t), we get the desired result by summing
(2.1) over 1 ≤ i ≤ N . 
We will show that the large time behavior of (x, v) is governed by (xc, vc). In view of
this, we replace
xi(t)− xc(t)→ xˆi(t), vi(t)− vc(t)→ vˆi(t),
in our model (2.1) to get
dxˆi
dt
= vˆi,
dvˆi
dt
=
λx
N
N∑
j=1
φˆij
(
xˆj(t)− xˆi(t)
)
+
λv
N
N∑
j=1
φˆij
(
vˆj(t)− vˆi(t)
)− λwxˆi(t),(3.2)
where φˆij := φ(xˆi, xˆj). Note that
xˆc(t) = vˆc(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.(3.3)
From now on, we study only this centralized version for clarity and simplicity.
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3.2. Two herding functionals: We define two kinds of herding energies E1 and E2 and
prove their decay property. E1 is defined on a rather stringent assumptions on the parameters
and initial configuration, but an explicit exponential herding rate can be derived (Theorem
3.3). For E2, such explicit herding rate is not available, but restrictions on the parameters
and initial configuration can be relaxed a lot (Theorem 3.6). To state our main theorem,
we first need to define some notations to be kept throughout this paper.
• L2 deviation and covariance functionals:
X(t) =
N∑
i=1
|xˆi(t)|2, V (t) =
N∑
i=1
|vˆi(t)|2
and
C(X,V )(t) =
N∑
i=1
xˆi(t) · vˆi(t).
• Weighted L2 deviation and weighted covariance functionals:
Xφ(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij |xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)|2, Vφ(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij |vˆi(t)− vˆj(t)|2
and
Cφ(X,V )(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆi(t)− xˆj(t))(vˆi(t)− vˆj(t)).
We define the herding behavior of market:
Definition 3.2. Let (xˆ(t), vˆ(t)) be the solution to (3.2). Then, we say that the herding
phenomena occurs if
lim
t→∞ |xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| = 0 and limt→∞ |vˆi(t)− vˆj(t)| = 0 for all i 6= j.
We now state our main theorem.
3.3. Main result I - Exponential herding: Define the herding energy of the market by
E1(t) = λwX(t) + 2λ
2
x
(λx + λw)λv
C(X,V )(t) + V (t).
Theorem 3.3. Let γ > 0. Suppose the interaction strength λx, λv and λw satisfy
1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λw > 1.(3.4)
Assume that the initial configuration satisfies
max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)| < 1
2
√√√√(1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λw
)2/γ
− 1(3.5)
and
E1(0) < 3
2
(
1− M0
2
)
λw max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|2,(3.6)
where M0 denotes
M0 =
1
(1 + 4 maxi,j |xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|2) γ2
.(3.7)
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Then the herding functional E1 decays exponentially fast:
E1(t) ≤ e−κtE1(0),
where the decay rate κ is explicitly given by
κ = δmin
{
1
2
,−1 + 1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λwM0
}
2λ2x
(λx + λw)λv
and 0 < δ < 1 is a constant to be chosen in the proof. Moreover, we have
max
i,j
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| < 2 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|(3.8)
for all t ≥ 0.
Remark 3.4. (1) E1 is always non-negative under the condition of Theorem 3.3. (2) The set
of (x, v) satisfying the above conditions (3.5) and (3.6) is non-empty. The proof of these
remarks will be given at the end of Section 4.
An immediate corollary is that the market shows an exponentially fast herding phenomena.
Corollary 3.5. Under the assumptions in Theorem 3.3, herding occurs exponentially fast
in the market:
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)|2 ≤ C1e−κtE1(0), |vˆi(t)− vˆj(t)|2 ≤ C2e−κtE1(0) (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N)
for
C1 =
4
(2−M0)λw and C2 =
4M0λw
2M0λw − α2 .
Here, α denotes
α =
2λ2x
(λx + λw)λv
and M0 is defined by (3.7).
3.4. Main result II - Herding without decaying rate: We define another market
energy E2(t) that eventually vanishes even without any restrictions on λx, λv, λw > 0 and
initial configurations. First, we define
Sγ(t) :=

1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
{
1
(1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2) r−22
− 1
}
, (0 < γ < 2)
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
log (1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2), (γ = 2)
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
{
1− 1
(1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2) r−22
}
. (γ > 2)
(3.9)
Note that Sγ(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Now, for any λx, λv, λw > 0, we define the herding energy
E2(t) of the market by
E2(t) := λwX(t) + V (t) + λxβ−1γ Sγ(t),
where βγ > 0 is
βγ =

2− γ, (0 < γ < 2)
2, (γ = 2)
γ − 2. (γ > 2)
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Theorem 3.6. For any positive constants λx, λv and λw with initial data {xi(0), vi(0)}Ni=1,
E2(t) goes to 0 as t tends to ∞.
Remark 3.7. (1) For any positive constants λx, λv and λw, E2 is non-negative. (2) Theorem
3.6 generalizes Theorem 3.3 in the sense that we do not impose any restriction on the initial
configuration, nor on the parameters λx, λv and λw except for positivity. Explicit herding
rate, however, is not available in this case.
This leads to the following general herding phenomena, which holds unconditionally.
Corollary 3.8. Under the assumptions in Theorem 3.6, the herding phenomena occurs in
the market:
lim
t→∞ |xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| = 0, limt→∞ |vˆi(t)− vˆj(t)| = 0. (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N)
4. Proof of Theorem 3.3: Exponentially fast herding
Before we delve into the proof of the main theorem, we establish several technical lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. We have
d
dt
X(t) = 2C(X,V )(t),
d
dt
V (t) = −2λwC(X,V )(t)− λxCφ(X,V )(t)− λvVφ(t).
Proof. The first identity is immediate:
d
dt
N∑
i=1
|xˆi(t)|2 = 2
N∑
i=1
xˆi(t) · vˆi(t).
For the second one, we compute
d
dt
N∑
i=1
|vˆi(t)|2 = 2
N∑
i=1
vˆi(t) ·
{
− λwxˆi(t) + λx
N
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆj(t)− xˆi(t)) + λv
N
N∑
j=1
φˆij(vˆj(t)− vˆi(t))
}
≡ I + II + III.
Then, clearly,
I = −2λw
N∑
i=1
xˆi(t) · vˆi(t).
In view of (3.1), we have
II =
2λx
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij vˆi · (xˆj − xˆi)
= −λx
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆi − xˆj) · (vˆi − vˆj).
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Similarly,
III =
2λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij vˆi · (vˆj − vˆi)
= −λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij |vˆi − vˆj |2.
Therefore,
d
dt
N∑
i=1
|vˆi(t)|2 = −2λw
N∑
i=1
xˆi · vˆi
− λx
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆi − xˆj) · (vˆi − vˆj)
− λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij |vˆi − vˆj |2.

We also need to consider the time evolution of C(X,V )(t):
Lemma 4.2. For any t > 0
d
dt
C(X,V )(t) = V (t)− λwX(t)− λx
2
Xφ(t)− λv
2
Cφ(X,V )(t).
Proof. See
d
dt
N∑
i=1
xˆi(t) · vˆi(t) =
N∑
i=1
dxˆi
dt
· vˆi + xˆi · dvˆi
dt
≡ I + II.
Computation for I is direct:
I =
N∑
i=1
|vˆi|2.
For II, we consider
II =
N∑
i=1
xˆi ·
{
− λwxˆi(t) + λx
N
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆj(t)− xˆi(t)) + λv
N
N∑
j=1
φˆij(vˆj(t)− vˆi(t))
}
≡ II1 + II2 + II3.
We then compute each term. II1 clearly is
II1 = −λw
N∑
i=1
|xˆi(t)|2.
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From (3.1) and a simple symmetry argument, we get
II2 ≡ λx
N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij xˆi · (xˆj − xˆi)
= −λx
N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij xˆi · (xˆi − xˆj)
= − λx
2N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij |xˆi − xˆj |2
and
II3 ≡ λv
N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij xˆi · (vˆj − vˆi)
= −λv
N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij xˆi · (vˆi − vˆj)
= − λv
2N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij(xˆi − xˆj) · (vˆi − vˆj),
so that
II = −λw
N∑
i=1
|xˆi|2
− λx
2N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij |xˆi − xˆj |2
− λv
2N
∑
i
∑
j
φˆij(xˆi − xˆj)(vˆi − vˆj).

4.1. Proof of Theorem 3.3: We divide the proof into the following two steps:
Step 1: Step 1 is devoted to the proof of the following claim:
Claim: Define T > 0 by
T = sup
{
t ∈ R+
∣∣ max
i,j
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| ≤ 2 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|
}
.
Then we have
d
dt
E1(t) ≤ −κE1(t)
for 0 ≤ t < T . Here κ > 0 is a constant defined in the statement of Theorem 3.3.
Proof. Recall the definition of α in Corollary 3.5:
α :=
2λ2x
(λx + λw)λv
.
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Then, by Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, we have
d
dt
E1(t) = 2λwC(X,V ) + α
{
V − λwX − λx
2
Xφ − λv
2
Cφ(X,V )
}
+
{
− 2λwC(X,V )− λxCφ(X,V )− λvVφ
}
= αV − αλwX − αλx
2
{
Xφ +
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)
Cφ(X,V ) +
λv
λx
2
α
Vφ
}
.
(4.1)
Now, using
X(t) =
N∑
i=1
xˆi · xˆi
=
N∑
i=1
(xˆi − xˆc) · xˆi (xˆc = 0)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(xˆi − xˆj) · xˆi
=
1
2N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
|xˆi − xˆj |2
=
1
2N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(1− φˆij)|xˆi − xˆj |2 + 1
2
Xφ(t),
we obtain
−αλwX = −1
2
αλwX − 1
2
αλwX
= −1
2
αλwX − αλw
4N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(1− φˆij)|xˆi − xˆj |2 − 1
4
αλwXφ(t).
Therefore, we have from (4.1)
d
dt
E1(t) = αV − 1
2
αλwX − αλw
4N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(1− φˆij)|xˆi − xˆj |2
− αλx
2
{
(1 +
λw
2λx
)Xφ +
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)
Cφ(X,V ) +
λv
λx
2
α
Vφ
}
≤ αV − 1
2
αλwX
− αλx
2
{
(1 +
λw
2λx
)Xφ +
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)
Cφ(X,V ) +
λv
λx
2
α
Vφ
}
≡ αV − 1
2
αλwX +R.
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We set L = 1 + λw2λx for simplicity, and compute
R = −αλx
2
{
LXφ +
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)
Cφ(X,V ) +
2λv
λxα
Vφ
}
= −αλx
2
{
L
(
Xφ +
1
L
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)
Cφ(X,V ) +
1
4L2
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)2Vφ
)
+
λ2vλw
2λ3x
Vφ
}
= −αλx
2
{
L
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij
(
(xˆi − xˆj) + 1
2L
(λv
λx
+
2
α
)
(vˆi − vˆj)
)2
+
λ2vλw
2λ3x
Vφ
}
≤ −αλ
2
vλw
4λ2x
Vφ.
(4.2)
Since we are assuming
max
i,j
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| ≤ 2 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|,
we have
φˆij ≥M0
for M0 defined in (3.7). Therefore,
Vφ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij |vˆi − vˆj |2
≥ M0
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
|vˆi − vˆj |2
=
2M0
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(vˆi − vˆj)vˆi
= 2M0
N∑
i=1
(vˆi − vˆc)vˆi
= 2M0
N∑
i=1
|vˆi|2, (vˆc = 0)
which gives from (4.2)
R ≤ −αλ
2
vλw
2λ2x
M0V.
Finally, we go back to (4.1) with these computations to derive
d
dt
E1(t) ≤ −αλw
2
X −
{
− 1 + λ
2
vλw
2λ2x
M0
}
αV
≤ − 2λ
2
x
(λx + λw)λv
min
{
1
2
,−1 + 1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λwM0
}
(λwX + V ).
(4.3)
Next, we need to show that there exists δ > 0 such that
−(λwX + V ) ≤ −δ(λwX + αC(X,V ) + V ),(4.4)
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which is equivalent to find δ such that
(1− δ)
{
λwX − δ
1− δαC(X,V ) + V
}
≥ 0.
This holds if
δ2
(1− δ)2α
2 − 4λw ≤ 0.
Recalling the definition of α, it can be rewritten as
δ2
(1− δ)2 ≤ λw
λ2v
λ2x
(
λw
λx
+ 1
)2
,
which holds true for sufficiently small δ > 0. Now, with this choice of δ, we can combine
(4.3) and (4.4) to close the desired Gronwall inequality:
d
dt
E1(t) ≤ − 2λ
2
x
(λx + λw)λv
min
{
1
2
,−1 + 1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λwM0
}
δE1(t).

Step 2: We now prove that T prolongs to infinity:
Claim: T =∞, that is,
max
i,j
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| < 2 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|
for all t > 0.
Proof. We first rewrite (3.5) as
1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λwM0 > 1
and use the positivity of λx and λw to get
2λwM0 >
4λ4x
(λx + λw)2λ2v
= α2,
or, equivalently
0 <
α2
2M0λw
< 1.
With this and the fact that 0 < M0 < 2, which follows from the definition of M0, we see
that
0 ≤ {1− M0
2
}
λwX(t)
≤ {1− M0
2
}
λwX +
M0λw
2
N∑
i=1
(
xˆi +
α
M0λw
vˆi
)2
+
{
1− α
2
2M0λw
}
V
=
{
1− M0
2
}
λwX +
M0λw
2
{
X +
2α
M0λw
C(X,V ) +
α2
M20λ
2
w
V
}
+
{
1− α
2
2M0λw
}
V
= λwX(t) +
2λ2x
(λx + λw)λv
C(X,V )(t) + V (t)
= E1(t).
(4.5)
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Therefore, combining this with the result of Claim 1, we get,
X(t) ≤ E1(0)
(1− M02 )λw
e−κt.(4.6)
Now, contrary to the claim, suppose that there are i0 and j0 such that
|xˆi0(T0)− xˆj0(T0)| = 2 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|(4.7)
for some T0 > 0. Then, for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T0, we have from (4.6)
|xˆi0(t)− xˆj0(t)|2 ≤ 2|xˆi0(t)|2 + 2|xˆj0(t)|2
≤ 2X(t)
≤ E1(0)
(1− M02 )λw
e−κt.
Therefore, applying the result of Step I, we deduce for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0
|xˆi0(t)− xˆj0(t)|2 ≤
2E1(0)
(1− M02 )λw
< 3 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|2.
The last inequality is from (3.6):
E1(0) < 3
2
(
1− M0
2
)
λw max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|2.
In conclusion, we have
|xˆi0(t)− xˆj0(t)| <
√
3 max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T0, which is contradictory to (4.7). Therefore, T = ∞. This completes the
proof. 
4.2. Proof of Corollary 3.5: By definition of X, we have
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)|2 ≤ 2X(t).
Then (4.6) gives the desired result. The proof for V is similar.
4.3. Proof of Remark 3.4. (1) It was shown in (4.5) that E1(t) is positive under our
assumptions in Theorem 3.3.
(2) We only consider the case where there are at least two players in the market, that is
N ≥ 2. For this, we define η by
η ≡ 1
2
√√√√(1
2
(
λv
λx
)2
λw
)2/γ
− 1 > 0,
where the positivity of η comes from (3.4). With this η, we choose x1(0) and x2(0) as
x1(0) =
1
3
η and x2(0) = −1
3
η,
and set all the remaining xi(0) and vj(0) to be zero. Since xc(0) = 0 and vc(0) = 0, we can
say xi(0) = xˆi(0) and vi(0) = vˆi(0). Then, we have
max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)| = 2
3
η < η.
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Moreover, vˆ(0) = 0 implies C(X,V )(0) = V (0) = 0 and xˆ1(0) + xˆ2(0) = 0 does |xˆ1(0)| =
|xˆ2(0)|. Therefore,
E1(0) = λw
(|xˆ1(0)|2 + |xˆ2(0)|2)
= 2λw|xˆ1(0)|2
=
2
4
λw|2xˆ1(0)|2
<
3
2
(
1− M0
2
)
λw max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|2.
In the last line, we used
0 < M0 ≤ 1
and
|2xˆ1(0)|2 = max
i,j
|xˆi(0)− xˆj(0)|2.
5. Proof of Theorem 3.6: Herding without explicit decay rate
We start with establishing technical lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. For any γ > 0, we have
dSγ(t)
dt
= βγCφ(X,V )(t),(5.1)
where βγ > 0 is given by
βγ =

2− γ, (0 < γ < 2)
2, (γ = 2)
γ − 2. (γ > 2)
Proof. When γ 6= 2, we have
d
dt
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
1
(1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2) r−22
= (2− γ)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(xˆi − xˆj)(vˆi − vˆj)(
1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2
) γ
2
= (2− γ)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆi − xˆj)(vˆi − vˆj).
For γ = 2, we similarly compute
d
dt
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
log (1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2) = 2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(xˆi − xˆj)(vˆi − vˆj)
(1 + |xˆi − xˆj |2)
= 2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij(xˆi − xˆj)(vˆi − vˆj).

Lemma 5.2. For λx, λv, λw > 0, we have
(1) First derivative:
E ′2(t) = −λvVφ(t).
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(2) Second derivative:
E ′′2 (t) = −
λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
φˆ′ij |vˆi − vˆj |2 + 2φˆij (vˆi − vˆj) ·
(
vˆ′i − vˆ′j
))
.
(3) Third derivative:
E ′′′2 (t) = −
λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆ′′ij |vˆi − vˆj |2
− λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
4φˆ′ij (vˆi − vˆj) ·
(
vˆ′i − vˆ′j
))
− λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
2φˆij
(
vˆ′i − vˆ′j
) · (vˆ′i − vˆ′j))
− λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
2φˆij (vˆi − vˆj) ·
(
vˆ′′i − vˆ′′j
))
.
Proof. (1) We differentiate E2(t) and use Lemma 5.1 to get
d
dt
{
λwX + V +
λx
βγ
Sγ
}
= 2λwC(X,V ) +
{
− 2λwC(X,V )− λxCφ(X,V )− λvVφ
}
+
λx
βγ
βγCφ(X,V )
= −λvVφ.
Identities in (2) and (3) follow directly from differentiating −λvVφ in the r.h.s. 
Lemma 5.3. Fix t > 0. Assume {vˆi(t)}i=1,...,N are all identical, but {xˆi(t)}i=1,...,N are
not. That is, ∑
i,j
|vˆi(t)− vˆj(t)| = 0,
∑
i,j
|xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)| 6= 0.
Then the first, second derivatives of E2 vanish at t:
E ′2(t) = E ′′2 (t) = 0,
and the third derivative of E2 is strictly negative at t:
E ′′′2 (t) < 0.
Proof. E ′2(t) = E ′′2 (t) = 0 is clear from Lemma 5.2 (1) and (2). For E ′′′2 (t), recall from
Lemma 5.2 (3) that, when {vˆi(t)}i=1,...,N are all identical, all but the third term in the r.h.s
vanishes, yielding
E ′′′2 (t) = −
2λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij
∣∣vˆ′i − vˆ′j∣∣2.(5.2)
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Therefore, our goal is reduced to showing that the right hand side is not zero. For this, we
note from (3.2) that
vˆ′i − vˆ′j = −λw (xˆi − xˆj) +
λx
N
N∑
k=1
φˆik(xˆk − xˆi) + λv
N
N∑
k=1
φˆik(vˆk − vˆi)
− λx
N
N∑
k=1
φˆjk(xˆk − xˆj)− λv
N
N∑
k=1
φˆjk(vˆk − vˆj),
which, under our assumption of identical favorability, reduces to
vˆ′i − vˆ′j = −λw (xˆi − xˆj) +
λx
N
N∑
k=1
φˆik(xˆk − xˆi)− λx
N
N∑
k=1
φˆjk(xˆk − xˆj).
Now, for a vector xˆi, let xˆ
k
i denote the kth element of xˆi. That is, xˆi = (xˆ
1
i , xˆ
2
i , . . . , xˆ
M
i ).
Then from our assumption, we can find i0 6= j0 and d such that
min
i
xˆdi = xˆ
d
i0 < xˆ
d
j0 = maxi
xˆdi and xˆ
d
i0 ≤ · · · ≤ xˆdj0 .
For such choice of i0, j0 and d, we have
vˆ′di0 − vˆ′dj0 = −λw
(
xˆdi0 − xˆdj0
)
+
λx
N
N∑
k=1
φˆi0k(xˆ
d
k − xˆdi0)−
λx
N
N∑
k=1
φˆj0k(xˆ
d
k − xˆdj0) > 0.
We now turn back to (5.2) with this observation to obtain the desired result:
E ′′′2 (t) = −
2λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij
∣∣vˆ′i − vˆ′j∣∣2
≤ −2λv
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φˆij
∣∣vˆ′di − vˆ′dj ∣∣2
≤ −2λv
N
φˆi0j0
∣∣vˆ′di0 − vˆ′dj0 ∣∣2
< 0.

5.1. Proof of Theorem 3.6: We first recall the following invariance principle by LaSalle
[36]:
Definition 5.4. [36] A setM is said to be invariant if each solution starting inM remains
in M for all t. That is,
x(0) ∈M ⇒ x(t) ∈M for all t.
Theorem 5.5. [36] Consider the system of differential equations
(5.3) x˙ = F (x)
where x(t) =
(
x1(t), . . . , xN (t)
)
and F is a vector field. Let L(x) be a scalar function with
continuous first partials for all x. Assume that
i) L(x(t)) > 0 for all x 6= 0,
ii) L˙(x(t)) ≤ 0 for all x.
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Let E be the set of all points where L˙(x) = 0, and letM be the largest invariant set contained
in E. Then every solution of (5.3) bounded for all t ≥ 0 approaches M as t→∞.
We now start the proof of Theorem 3.6. First, recall that the herding functional E2(t) is
non-negative:
E2(t) ≥ 0,
and vanishes only when xˆ(t) = vˆ(t) = 0. We also have
(5.4) E ′2(t) = −λvVφ(t) ≤ 0.
The equality holds only when {vˆi}i=1,...,N are all identical. (5.4) also implies the boundness
of the solutions. Therefore, E2 satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.5. Now, define E to be
the null-space of Vφ(t):
E :=
{
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆN , vˆ1, . . . , vˆN ) ∈ R2MN | vˆ1 = · · · = vˆN
}
.
Since we are considering the centralized model, and vˆc(t) = 0, E actually is
E :=
{
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆN , vˆ1, . . . , vˆN ) ∈ R2MN | vˆ1 = · · · = vˆN = 0
}
.
LetM be the largest invariance set in E. In view of the above invariance theorem, our goal
is to verify that M is trivial:
M = {0} ⊆ R2MN .(5.5)
For this, suppose contrarily that there exists an open interval I and a solution {xˆi(t), vˆi(t)}Ni=1
to (3.2) in M such that ∑
i,j
|xˆi(s)− xˆj(s)| 6= 0 for s ∈ I.
Since {xˆi(t), vˆi(t)}Ni=1 ∈ E by definition, we have
vˆ1(t) = · · · = vˆN (t) = 0,
and by Lemma 5.3, the first and second derivative of E2(t) vanishes while the third derivative
E ′′′2 (t) remains strictly negative on I:
E ′2(t) = E ′′2 (t) = 0, E ′′′2 (t) < 0 on I.
Therefore, for any [t1, t2] ⊂ I, we have from the Taylor’s theorem
0 = E ′2(t2) = E ′2(t1) + (t2 − t1)E ′′2 (t1) +
∫ t2
t1
(t2 − s)2E ′′′2 (s)ds
=
∫ t2
t1
(t2 − s)2E ′′′2 (s)ds
< 0,
which is a contradiction. This proves (5.5). The desired result then follows from Theorem
5.5.
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6. Numerical Simulation
In this section, we present three numerical tests demonstrating the herding behavior in
the market. In Test 1, we numerically verify Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.6 in the case
(M = 1, N = 5) with different choices of parameters and initial data. In Test 2, we present
trajectories of the numerical solution to (3.2) for two dimensional problem (M = 2, N = 4)
to visualize the herding phenomenon in multi-d case. In Test 3, we give two dimensional
histograms for each variable x and v with M = 2, N = 500 for the simulation of large
number of players. We employ a fourth-order Runge-Kutta method for the time evolution
with fixed time steps in all simulations.
6.1. Numerical test 1. We recall three scenarios of the dynamic market signals presented
in Section 2 and fix throughout test 1 as
w1(x, t) = 4 cos(4t), w2(x, t) = x1(t), w3(x, t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t).
For simplicity, we consider five market players N = 5 and one asset M = 1.
In the numerical Test 1-1 and 1-2 below, the initial data (xi(0), vi(0)) have been chosen
randomly, and the only difference is the choice of x1(0):
Test 1-1 : x1(0) = 10, Test 1-2 : x1(0) = −10.
The choice x1(0) = 10 means that initially market player x1 has viewed the market positively,
and choice x1(0) = −10 means the opposite. This is to compare the influence of the
assessment of the influential player x1(t) on the market.
In Test 1-3, we consider the dynamics of solutions corresponding to an initial configuration
that doesn’t satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.3. We observe that essential features of
Theorem 3.3 break down but the result of Theorem 3.6 still holds. It demonstrates that
the conditions in Theorem 3.3 are essential. (See Remark 3.7.) Throughout Test 1-1 to 1-3,
we consider numerical solutions to the non-centralized model (2.1) to clearly manifest the
influence of (xc, vc) on the herding dynamics.
6.1.1. Numerical test 1-1: (The case of x1(0) = 10) In this test, we choose γ = 1.5,
λx = 0.1, λv = 3 and λw = 2, which satisfy the parameter assumption (3.4). Initial data
is randomly chosen in [−10, 10] × [−10, 10] to satisfy (3.5) and (3.6) in Theorem 3.3. We
obtain numerical solutions to the original non-centralized herding model (2.1) corresponding
to each of the three scenarios and plot them in Figure 1,2 and 3, respectively. The final
time is taken as T = 6.
In Figure 1, we plost x and v in the case of w1(x, t) = 4 cos(4t). We observe that xi, vi
tend to show similar patterns after t = 4. We also see that the average favorability vc moves
up and down. Since the market signal w1 has a oscillating pattern, it is natural to observe
such situation in which the market players tend to change their minds frequently.
In Figure 2, the behaviors of x and v are provided when w2(x, t) = x1. We see that
the numerical solution to the second scenario shows very different phase compared to those
presented in Figure 1 even though they start with the same initial random data. After t = 4,
each vi seems to converge to a fixed constant about 4, which leads to linear increase in xi.
In Figure 3, behaviors of x, v are shown for w3(x, t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t). We observe that vc
remains unchanged. Recalling Lemma 3.1 implies ddtvc(t) = 0 in this case, it is natural to
have such a fixed constant vc. We can observe that it also shows the collective behaviors
after t = 4.
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Figure 1. w1(x, t) = 4 cos(4t)
Figure 2. w2(x, t) = x1(t)
We now check the evolution of two herding energies: E1(t) and E2(t). In Figure 4a and 4b,
we plot E1(t) and E2(t) in the log sense, respectively. We observe that each herding energy
decreases monotonically toward 0. In Figure 4c, it is verified that maxi,j |xi(t)− xj(t)| can
not attain the bound 2 maxi,j |xi(0)− xj(0)| for all t ≥ 0 as was guaranteed in (3.8).
6.1.2. Numerical test 1-2: (The case of x1(0) = −10) In this test, we replace x1(0) as
x1(0) = 10→ x1(0) = −10,
with all the other initial configuration and parameters fixed. Note that the new initial
condition also satisfies conditions of Theorem 3.3.
In Figure 5, 6 and 7, we plot the numerical solutions to (2.1) for each scenario upto T = 6,
respectively. In all these figures, we observe the herding phenomenon in the expected rate
of returns and favorabilities.
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Figure 3. w3(x, t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t)
(a) Herding energy E1(t) (b) Herding energy E2(t) (c) maxi,j |xi − xj |
Figure 4. Herding energies and bound
The main difference compared to the Test 1-1 is observed in Figure 6, where we clearly
see the influence of negative evaluation on the asset by player x1 in that, in contrast to
Figure 2, the negative assessment of the influential market player on the rate of return of
the asset (x1(0) < 0) leads to the ever-decreasing expected rate of returns, and emergence
of negative value of vc even if we initially have vc(0) > 0.
In Figure 8a, Figure 8b and Figure 8c, we can see that each herding energy decays
monotonically and the uniform bound 2 maxi,j |xi(0) − xj(0)| can not be attained for all
t ≥ 0, as in the test 1-1.
6.1.3. Numerical test 1-3. (Removal of restrictions on parameters) In this test, we
provide a numerical example which shows that the herding behavior still occurs even when
the restrictions on the paramenters and initial configurations imposed on Theorem 3.3 are
not satisfied, as was guranteed by Theorem 3.6.
For this, we choose γ = 1, λx = 2, λv = 1 and λw = 0.5. Since there is no restriction on
initial data in Theorem 3.6, we choose them randomly in [−15, 15] × [−15, 15]. In Figure
A PARTICLE MODEL FOR THE HERDING PHENOMENA 23
Figure 5. w1(x, t) = 4 cos(4t)
Figure 6. w2(x, t) = x1(t)
9 - 11, we plot the numerical solutions to (2.1) upto T = 15. These figures show that the
desired herding phenomena occurs.
We, however, observe that various important features of Theorem 3.3 do not hold. Figure
12a shows that E1(t) does not decrease monotonically anymore, and even may exceed E1(0).
We observe that E1(t) can take negative values. In Figure 12c, we also see that maxi,j |xi(t)−
xj(t)| can exceed 2 maxi,j |xi(0)−xj(0)| in this case, which implies that the proof of Theorem
3.3 in Section 4 breaks down. Meanwhile, in Figure 12b, E2(t) decreases monotonically
toward 0 even with same initial data.
6.2. Numerical test 2: In this test, we consider the trajectory of numerical solutions to
the centralized herding model (3.2) to visualize the dynamics of solutions. We choose γ = 2,
λx = 1, λv = 1 and λw = 1, which do not fit into the condition of Theorem 3.3. The herding
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Figure 7. w3(x, t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t)
(a) Herding energy E1(t) (b) Herding energy E2(t) (c) maxi,j |xi − xj |
Figure 8. Herding energies and bound
phenomena is still guaranteed by Theorem 3.6. For the clarity of simulation, we take the
number of assets and the number of players as M = 2, N = 4, and pick initial data from
[−5, 5]× [−5, 5] such that
xc(0) = vc(0) = 0.
Figure 13 - 17 present the trajectory of each xi and vi upto final time T = 25. In
each figure, ‘o’ and ‘x’ stand for the endpoint and the starting point of each trajectory
respectively. These figures show how the configurations of xi and vi evolve as time passes.
Even though their movement seems to be very tangle, all fluctuations are getting smaller in
each step, eventually leading to herding phenomena.
6.3. Numerical test 3: In this test, we simulate the behavior of large number of players
dealing with two assets (M = 2, N = 500). We set γ = 1.5, λx = 1, λv = 1 and λw = 1 and
choose initial data from [−5, 5]× [−5, 5] to be
xc(0) = vc(0) = 0.
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Figure 9. w1(x, t) = 4 cos(4t)
Figure 10. w2(x, t) = x1(t)
We take final time as T = 20. As in test 2, we consider the numerical solution to the
centralized model (3.2).
In Figure 18 - 22, we plot histograms of xi and vi at t = 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20, respectively.
In each histogram, each boundary cell count the number of outliers in its designated region.
For example, the top left cell counts the number of market players in (−∞,−5) × (5,∞).
We see that, except for Figure 18, there is no outlier at t = 5, 10, 15 and 20. As time flows,
xi and vi are concentrated to centers (0, 0) and (0, 0), respectively. In Figure 22, we observe
that all market players have similar expected rate of returns and favorabilies enough to be
contained in one pixel.
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Figure 11. w3(x, t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t)
(a) Herding energy E1(t) (b) Herding energy E2(t) (c) maxi,j |xi − xj |
Figure 12. Herding energies and bound
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we reinterpreted the rate of return and the favorability as phase point on
phase space, and derive an agent based particle model for herding phenomena. We then
use this model to prove the herding behavior induced by various dynamic market signals.
We also provided various numerical simulations to verify and visualize these results. This
work can be developed or extended in several direction. First, particle model with noise is
definitely on the first place in the next-to-do list. We restricted ourselves to noiseless situa-
tion for clarity in this paper. Secondly, upon incorporating collision avoidance mechanism,
our model can be naturally modified to model herding or swarming behavior of particles,
animals, bacteria, individuals, unmanned vehicles and so on. Thirdly, we didn’t consider
the case where the players can enter or leave the market based on the asset prices. This
also seems to be interesting possible future work. Finally, kinetic and hydrodynamic limit
of this model and verifying herding phenomena at those levels will be be treated in future
works.
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Figure 13. t = 0 to 5
Figure 14. t = 5 to 10
Figure 15. t = 10 to 15
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Figure 16. t = 15 to 20
Figure 17. t = 20 to 25
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